Semper Fidelis (Semper Fi)
By : Maj.Gen. Norman J. Anderson USMC (Ret) and Col. William K. Snyder USMC (Ret)
SCAT By : Maj.Gen. Norman J. Anderson USMC (Ret) and Col. William K. Snyder USMC (Ret)
Semper Fidelis (Semper Fi)
Published in the September 1992 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette.
On 3 September 1942, in the heroically contested skies over Guadalcanal. a Marine transport. unescorted and unarmed, flashed its recognition signal to Henderson Field. When this, the first of the SCAT aircraft. rolled to a stop several minutes later, the U.S. Marines had inaugurated a totally unique combat air service.
In the eastern Solomons. Control of the sea by the Japanese was virtually total following the Marine
landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August. With surface re-supply and medevac thus hopelessly smothered,
there was but one feasible alternative -- combat air transport. Thus it was that Marine Utility Squadron
253 (VMJ-253) the forerunner of SCAT, Was rushed to the South Pacific. It became a part of the
Marine’s valiant struggle to retain their toe hold in the eastern Solomons.
"SCAT" has meant many things in many languages, nut to the bedeviled Marines on Guadalcanal SCAT
came to mean "lifeline" and "Contact with the outside world." SCAT meant rations; It men precious spare
parts; It meant emergency medical attention and evacuation. It meant high octane gasoline and personnel
replacements. Finally if all went well, it might come to mean a ride back to someplace where some sort of
transportation would set a man headed east again to home and the land of the big PX .
Actually, SCAT meant South Pacific Air Transport, but most souls were too busy to bother with the
translation. SCAT was SCAT! (This appealing acronym did not become official until late October, but its
logic was evident almost from the start as the usefulness and composition of an all-Service air transport
organization became apparent.) Built on an initial group of 14 Douglas transports of VMJ-253, SCAT
eventually encompassed about 50 aircraft in 4 operating squadrons, 3 Marine and 1 Army. The latter was
borrowed as it were, during a New Caledonia refueling stop en-route to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's
Southwest Pacific Command.
The SCAT aircraft, the Douglas transport (known to naval aviation as the R4D, to the Army Air Corps as
the C-47, and to the airlines as the DC-3), was a big and efficient machine. By war's end, it would be the
Allied standard in every theater. Pioneering its use in the Pacific fell to Hawaii's Marine Aircraft Group
(MAG) 21 preparing for the Battle of Midway. But the August deployment of VMJ-253 marked the
R4D's combat debut. That marvelously sturdy economical. big-load long-haul machine set new
performance records in nearly every important category.
One of these achievements remains forever credited to the Marines of VMJ-253 when its dedicated
crews made the longest nonstop mass flight of twin- engine aircraft in aviation history. Eleven of them flew
for 15.9 hours from Naval Air Station (NAS) San Diego to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Ewa, HI.
Forty years later this flight, the first leg of VMJ- 253's rapid deployment to the South Pacific received
belated but worldwide recognition when the National Aeronautic Association. acting on behalf of the
world arbiter of such Matters, the Federation De Aeronautique Internationale presented VMJ-253
a certificate of record acknowledging the feat.
Much credit for this exceptional operation must go, of course. to the aeronautical engineers of the Navy
and of the Douglas Aircraft Company. Their modifications to the basic machine made long-duration flight
possible. And it was surely because all these efforts were so expertly combined that On 2 September
1942, more than 3 weeks following the initial Guadalcanal landings, the first of these big welcome birds
appeared in the skies over Henderson Field.
Based on subsequent operations one might wonder about the timing, 3 weeks after the initial landings. In
fact, the urgent piece-mealing of scarce assets into that distant battlefield signaled a turning point in history.
The enormous effort of the United States to mobilize its resources was beginnings by the summer of 1942,
to produce deployable units well equipped and with reliably trained personnel. They were committed as
they became available. Even had it been possible a time-consuming DESERT SHIELD type buildup was
out of the question in those circumstances. Japan's aggression now deep into the South Pacific, had to be
stopped at this critical juncture. Hence the calculated risks brought on by piece-mealing, so much in
contrast to the precision timing of later landing force assaults could only be accepted grimly at
Guadalcanal. "Press on" was the national battle cry. VMJ-253 did just that.
Marshaling the aircraft people, and materiel for this first deployment of Marine transports began early in
1942, not long after the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) under Brig. Gen. Roy S. Geiger was
dispatched from Quantico, VA, to San Diego CA. There the 1st MAW’s task, readying its units for
deployment. Took top priority. On a "not to interfere" basis. wing aircraft also were made available to the
Commander. Western Sea Frontier, for antisubmarine patrol of the waters off San Diego. Realistic
transport training began in earnest when the first R4Ds arrived to replace the earlier Douglas models
brought from the east coast, the R2D and the R3D. The R2D had served as the major commercial
transport in the United States until the advent of the R4D. It can be seen, then, how closely military air
transport was allied in equipment and techniques with its commercial counterpart. This fortunate symbiosis
fostered inter-changeability of aircraft and personnel. a major factor in the development of SCAT.
On a percentage basis, nowhere was this exchangeability more apparent than in the composition of
Marine transport crews, and particularly pilots, of SCAT's nucleus, VMJ-253. A significant portion of the
Marine Corps Reserve had been fashioned for this eventuality. From United, American, Eastern, Penn
Central, and TWA Airlines came the experience to provide the first pilots for 10 of SCAT's original
transpacific aircraft. Northwest Airlines provided the squadron executive officer whose rich background
included pioneering work in operational control procedures across the northern tier of the United States.
In addition to these experienced airline pilots, aviators with transport experience from the Regular
Establishment were melded into the organization. Others filled voids covering communications, navigation,
cargo handling, supply, and aircraft maintenance.
Seven second lieutenants just out of flight schools in Jacksonville, FL, and Corpus Christi, TX were sent
to American Airlines Military Transport School in Fort Worth, TX, to help augment this group. Along with
other pilots from the Regular Marine Corps they made up a portion of the copilot list and were requested
in the movement document. Still other freshly trained second lieutenant pilots attended navigation training
schools and served as navigators in some of VMJ-253's deploying crews. Soon, these younger pilots
would provide an expansion source on site in the South Pacific. As the situation developed. those qualified
were quickly designated First Pilot and took position as such on the daily flight schedule.
The Marine Corps airfield on Kearney Mesa, CA which would be consolidated with NAS Miramar at the
close of World War II, provided the locale for readying 1st MAW tactical Units to meet the Japanese.
From these runways squadrons of Grumman Hellcats, Vought Corsairs, and Douglas SBDs flew to
bombing and gunnery ranges. Alternating with them, transport crews honed their skills on instruments
single-engine procedures, and other emergency technique, including short air field work. In practice
tactical missions, Marine ground units based near Kearney Mesa were flown for combined training in air
delivery. Simulating combat insertion of squad-sized and larger units, these exercises closely resembled
anticipated combat conditions. MAG- 15 functioned as the transport training unit coordinating and
standardizing procedures and techniques for deploying transport personnel and organizations. Crews were
worked through uniform training syllabuses and readied for advanced procedures, including heavy takeoff
and landing techniques, celestial navigation, dead reckoning, radio direction finding, and communications.
Schools set up by MAG-15 produced many hundreds of pilots, navigators radiomen, aerial
photographers, and crew chiefs. These officers and men were sent to SCAT and its successors to fill the
continuing need for highly trained and skilled replacements. Upon completion of their syllabus, student
pilots had received approximately 70 hours in the R4D, all of which was in the actual control of aircraft.
Under the supervision of a qualified pilot, a transcontinental trip was flown, followed by a final check flight
conducted by a member of a board of specially selected check pilots. If successful, the student was then
certified for further assignment.
By summer, VMJ-253 had received delivery of its full allowance of aircraft fresh from the Douglas factory
in Long Beach. Since no aircraft carrier or other suitable ship could be made available to deliver these
aircraft to the combat zone, the alternative, flight ferry, fortunately, was both feasible and faster. This
however, presented several problems, chief of which was modifying the fuel system to carry an additional
800 gallons. This would double the cruising range, ensuring an adequate margin of safety for the 2,000
mile flight to Hawaii. NAS North Island installed eight 100-gallon neoprene tanks, four on either side of
the cabin deck, with interconnecting fuel lines feeding into the main tanks. A 40-foot fire hose attached to
the cabin tanks was to be run out the cabin door to drain the cabin tanks in an emergency. Proper fuel
management of the eight cabin tanks required a prescribed sequence in transferring fuel, accomplished so
as to maintain reasonably full wing tanks. Controlled fuel consumption was another aspect of fuel
management for the long flight to Hawaii and beyond. Each engine was tuned to the ultimate in flight
performance by repeated ground tests. Later in-flight adjustments were conducted on each aircraft by its
prospective crew. A cruising standard of approximately 35 gallons per hour per engine was a goal fixed
by flight planners but bettered in some instances by unusually efficient engines or particularly careful crews.
At this rate of consumption (with a ground speed of 150 knots), aircraft were expected to land at MCAS
Ewa in about 16 hours, including time to climb. These estimates were borne out with gratifying accuracy
providing a safety or confusion factor of approximately 40 percent. Domestic airline calculations at that
time for similar emergency reserves included fuel to a pre-planned alternate airfield plus an
additional 45 minutes. With an alternate available at Hilo on the island of Hawaii and Midway Island
1.200 miles to the northwest as an attainable fallback, these planning factors were accepted as generous
but none-the-less welcome.
On 23 August 1942 at 1800 hours the flight of 14 planes took to the air, led by Lt. Col. Perry K. Smith.
The squadron commanding officer Two medical doctors and 8 corpsmen were distributed among the 14
aircraft. Each person was permitted lO0 pounds of gear and each aircraft was loaded with 1.620 gallons
of aviation fuel (lO,000 pounds of fuel in today's more useful terminology). Tool boxes and spare parts
brought the gross load at takeoff to approximately 32,500 pounds. about 7 500 pounds more than that
allowed for DC3 passenger flights by the U.S. domestic airlines. The medics, with their stretchers and
other equipment aboard, provided a clear enough promise of ultimate destination somewhere west of
Hawaii where serious fighting would be found. It was a very loose formation to be sure. Each crew sought
to operate at maximum fuel efficiency! Deviating from optimum power settings only to maintain sight
contact with a section or division leader. At 3 1/2 hours out, one aircraft with an engine failure reversed
course for North Island, jettisoning all gear and tools and draining all cabin tanks to lighten its load to
landing maximums. Upon resumption of its flight 2 days later, it and its companion aircraft were joined by
a third closely following the rest of the squadron to the South Pacific.
The island hopping phase of relatively short flights began on 29 August after 2 days of rest. Significant
adjustments were made at this time to compasses and other instruments while four of the eight cabin tanks
were removed as now unnecessary impediments. Using a combination of celestial navigation and dead
reckoning, coupled with radio direction finding (RDF), the Pacific Ocean dots of Palmyra, Canton, and
Viti Levu in the Fiji’s were transited in successive daylight flights. After losing a day to the International
Date Line. the flight reached New Caledonia on 31 August. A dusty and fly-infested, but otherwise
vacant, airstrip at Plaines de Gaiacs on the west center of New Caledonia provided a one-night stop
before the squadron flew south on 1 September to Tontouta airfield. Tontouta was a bare bones
installation but with adequate runways and expansion capability it was to be the squadron's home base
until 1944. About 25 miles to the south lay Noumea. seaport and administrative capitol of New Caledonia
a "Vichy" French enclave. Aboard his flagship in Noumea harbor the Commander South Pacific
(ComSoPac) planned and supervised his strategy against the Japanese. Tontouta became his air transport
hub and SCAT was his vital communications tool. But for the time being the progenitor of SCAT. VMJ-
253 had its eyes intently focused on the beleaguered Marines on Guadalcanal.
The squadron commander after one short day to rest and determine operational and logistic guidelines on
3 September flew the first transport unescorted and unarmed to Henderson Field. With him came Brig.
Gen. Roy S. Geiger and key members of his 1st MAW staff. Brig. Gen. Geiger's personal flag was
hoisted! figuratively if not actually. that evening from the celebrated pagoda at Henderson Field. It was to
be his command post until mid-October when on the night of 13 October. naval shelling would reduce it
to splinters.
Brig. Gen. Geiger's command post was established at the focal point of two world powers at war. At this
time about 35,000 men were fighting and dying to defend or recapture Henderson Field. Japanese troops
contested its very edges, where their small arms fire added a disconcerting hazard to flight operations.
VW-253's transports, without defensive capabilities of any kind, had no alternative but to make their final
approaches with this added hazard in mind. As became the case with all the island landing strips in the
South Pacific, approach procedures to Henderson Field required identification maneuvers, which were
coded and changed at least daily. This factor, along with mandated radio silence, led most pilots to work
up their own individual notebook maps of each island airfield. These maps supplemented the ancient
nautical charts the pilots were forced to rely on. Electronic navigational aides were of little help as well.
Rudimentary transmissions without identification were emitted at each airfield for homing purposes, but
low power drastically limited their usefulness over ranges in excess of 15 miles. In many critical instances
these transmitters were found to be idled for unscheduled maintenance’s forcing reliance on dead
reckoning bristling with lofty peaks. For pilots accustomed to the air traffic control procedures of North
America and Europe, flying in heavy weather under these circumstances was a shocking experience,
justifiable only on the grounds of urgent military necessity. But cancellations for weather were unknown.
The air-ground team was at work.
In the days and weeks following Lt. Col. Smith's Right to Henderson Field, transports from VMJ-253
doubled and then tripled their daily service. Characteristically a flight left Tontouta in late morning, bringing
it to Guadalcanal during that part of the day thought least likely for Japanese fighters to be roaming the
skies. A dawn takeoff ensued with either Espiritu Santo or Efate as a refueling stop, either of which served
well as an off loading destination for medevac and other personnel. As these bases increased in logistical
importance, a greater share of flights made one or the other island a north-bound stop as well. Command
and staff personnel with intelligence and other support functions also found this routing more convenient
and time saving. Hence. within weeks, the preponderance of flights were routed through those two bases,
rather than directly from New Caledonia to Guadalcanal. Round-trip fuel requirements were thus
decreased, adding an equivalent amount to useful load.
An interesting contradiction developed in the matter of South Pacific weather. On many occasions when
approaching Guadalcanal. SCAT pilots flew on the fringes of a comforting cloud, a safe haven in the event
of being sighted by enemy fighters.
Thus developed the motto of SCAT securite en nuaces (security in the clouds) and SCAT's
telling symbol, the flying box car against a friendly billowing thunderhead. But the other side of the coin,
was that the weather was also an enemy to be respected. Capricious winds on long over-water flights
without radio navigational aids were a recipe for disaster if, as was frequently the case. lower cloud cover
made drift estimating unreliable. For example. a flight from Guadalcanal to a speck in the ocean such as
Efate, with no fuel taken at Guadalcanal, required something on the order of 6 over-water hours. Landfall
had to be made at low enough altitude to pick up the white strip of a coral beach. This was often difficult
due to poor visibility, and if visual contact with land was not established within 10 minutes after estimated
landfall, only one saving procedure remained a change of course to the center of the nearest major island.
In this case New Caledonia, 2 1/2 hours away, became the emergency destination. A climb to safe
altitude, say 6,000 feet, was required, husbanding precious fuel. Then, after sighting the expected land
mass, the most economical course to Tontouta had to be taken, followed by a straight-in landing. One
flight using this procedure experienced an engine failure on the landing rollout; it was out of fuel. Three
crew and 10 medical evacuees deplaned, grateful but wondering why it took so long. Only the navigator
and the pilots knew. And there were mechanical failures. An hour after takeoff from Guadalcanal one
pilot, forced to shut down an engine due to a swallowed valve, could not return because of "Condition
RED field under attack". With his closest alternate 450 miles away and with 12 stretcher cases aboard, he
fought to hold altitude at 3,000 feet and 90 knots. With the remaining engine straining and redlined, the
plane flew for the critical 5 hours to landing, all safe and sound.
Tontouta, as SCAT's main base became in time a full-fledged transport hub. The arrival in Noumea
Harbor of the SS Monroe on 25 September brought MAG-25's ground echelon, which would rapidly
provide headquarters, supply, and living facilities to sustain the MAG's intense support mission. Shortly
thereafter, the MAG's aircraft maintenance squadron arrived with its high level of aircraft engineering skills
and equipment. With that, MAG-25 was fully in business.
Base structure at other locations was improving simultaneously. At Efate and Espiritu Santo, Marine
Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212) and Marine Observation Squadron 251 (VMO- 251) had taken
station. At each location some progress had been made in developing facilities. SCAT made good use of
these from the start as alternate supply pickup points for Guadalcanal units. In short order, Navy
construction battalions (SeaBees) and amphibious construction units (Acorns) arrived at these sites to
work their legendary magic. Special operating areas. structures, and other facilities for cargo and
passenger handling soon became available as the impetus of supply planning began to make itself felt. with
the arrival of VMJ-152 in late October, air service to the Marines on Guadalcanal virtually doubled.
About this time. the 403d Army Troop Carrier Squadron joined forces with the Marines at Tontouta,
leading to the formal establishment of the inter-Service SCAT, which fell under the purview of the
commanding officer of MAG-25. SCAT was to receive two more augmentations of note.
In January 1943, Army doctors, nurses, and medics of the 801st Medical Air Evacuation Squadron
reported for duty. Standard practice called for a nurse or corpsman as an integral part of each aircraft
crew. It was their responsibility to supervise the loading, proper handling and care of wounded and
evacuees en route from the battlefronts to hospitals in the rear areas. SCAT's final augmentations
VMJ-153, was alerted for movement in December 1942. The squadron arrived at Tontouta with 12 fresh
aircraft and crews in March 1943. In late 1942, an urgently needed outlying base operating structure also
took shape. Specialized detachments of one officer and five enlisted men were assigned by MAG-25 to
handle passenger, freight, and communications problems for SCAT at the principal airfields it utilized.
Chief among these was the bomber field at Espiritu Santo. for it was responsive to the forward needs of
the commander of U.S. Air Units. South Pacific, whose flagship, USS Wright, rode at anchor a few miles
away.
Because of New Caledonia's proximity to Australia a major ally with industrial and agricultural capabilities
ties soon were established there to obtain specialized goods urgently required by forward units. In due
course, SCAT brought exhausted flight personnel from Guadalcanal to New Zealand and Australia for a
few days of rest and recreation before another commitment to combat. Thus, the support provided to
combat units on Guadalcanal eventually emanated from many sources growing in volume and diversity as
the industrial might of the Allies became ever more evident.
But SCAT in September 1942 started a life-sustaining flow of aircraft engines, steel runway matting food,
water, Jeeps, mail, bombs, torpedoes, ammunition, troops, replacement pilots, war correspondents,
stranded missionaries, the invaluable Australian coast watchers, and the evacuation of Japanese prisoners
to rear areas for interrogation all in the precarious atmosphere of a crucial battle on the verge of going
either way. Had these reliable R4Ds failed, or had the enemy's air offensive closed off the flow of air
freight and passengers to Henderson Field, the battle for the Solomon Islands might have ended in defeat
for the Allies. The period of 12, 13, and 14 October offered a vivid case in point. Repeated flights by 8
R4Ds, each delivering 12 to 15 drums of aviation gasoline from southern bases, kept the Marine fighters
and dive bombers flying. Mixed with these loads for the 1st MAW were torpedoes and drums of fuel for
the Navy's PT boats operating in Iron Bottom Sound. Personnel evacuation inevitably became the major
category of outbound loads from Henderson Field. After 5 September, wounded evacuees were on
virtually every plane. Those with the most serious injuries were flown directly to a major medical facility on
New Caledonia, evacuated to Australia, or sent home to the United States.
Because of the urgency of the task in September and October 1942, no coherent or comprehensive
record exists of MAG-25 and VMJ-253's exploits. The figures that do exist for later periods are
impressive if not astronomical. In one 6 - month period, SCAT flew 24 million pounds of freight and mail,
and transported 130,000 passengers. Overall, from November 1942 through June 1944 SCAT moved
21.813 tons of cargo and carried 235.596 passengers on 34,834 flights. Medical evacuees in the 4
months of 1942 totaled 3,200; in 1943 they numbered 24, 685 and in the first 6 months of 1944 they
numbered 14,575. SCAT accomplished these results with an amazing safety record. Only six aircraft
were lost between October 1942 and May 1945. In two of these crashes, no personnel casualties were
sustained; the remaining 4 crashes took the lives of 13 crew members and
19 passengers. Despite these losses, the safety record was incredible considering the millions of miles
flown in all kinds of weather. day and night. Not infrequently under fire in hostile series. Until 1943.
operations were conducted with very limited meteorology reports. abysmal communications, and only
primitive aids to navigation.
These facts are the more surprising considering that following the pioneering work of Lt. Col. Smith's
widely experienced pilots, subsequent crews were wartime products of the naval air training system.
Youthful. but soundly schooled by MAG-I5, their performance after joining SCAT was tested and
carefully supervised by the evolving structure and procedures of SCAT. Navigators, initially, were taken
from the flow of newly commissioned pilots reporting to MAG-15 at Kearney Mesa. In New Caledonia,
however, MAG-25 inaugurated an enlisted navigation training course that continues to this day. As for
equipment, credit must not be denied the reliable, R4D, the military version of the DC3. An enlarged side
door for cargo and a navigator’s astrodome distinguished it from its commercial version and qualified it for
its military mission. Later models continue their yeoman work today.
By November 1942, the profound effects of mobilization brought the country out of its defensive posture
around the world. MAG-25 and its corollary, SCAT. began to take on an air of measured competence as
contrasted to its earlier emergency mode. It would be a mistake to liken its character to that of a domestic
air operation. Wisely however it adopted operational techniques long accepted in the airline industry in
keeping with electronic and other hardware improvements. Detachments established at each of the
airfields from which materiel and personnel were moved to the combat units became more elaborate and
efficient. In the opposite directions semi-permanent representatives in Sydney Australians and Auckland
New Zealand handled arrangements for a rapidly expanding program of rest and recreation for
combat-weary flight crews.
As the fighting moved inexorably in the direction of the Philippines and Japans SCAT was early on the
scene at each invasion. Emergency re-supply casualty evacuation and air drop of combat necessities to
isolated fighting units was its proud stock in trade. Eventually, as the war moved west-ward and the
Solomon Islands became relatively secures the major Allied effort shifted to Gen. MacArthur's campaign
in the Southwest Pacific and Adm. Nimitz's thrust through the Central Pacific. SCAT assets that were
superfluous to ComSoPac's lessened mission joined the Marine transport squadrons of the Central Pacific
Combat Air Transport Service (CenCATS). In preparation for much increased operational intensity,
MAG-15 deployed from Kearney Mesa in April 1944 to form the successor to CenCATS. Known as
the Transport Sir Group, with two Marine squadrons and one Army squadron, this organization serviced
the Nimitz campaign through the Central Pacific to Japan.
After the surrender, it was on to China and Formosa.
The rudimentary transport capability embodied in the word SCAT has evolved into a highly versatile and
dedicated combat portion of Marine aviation. Encompassing long-range personnel transport, air drop of
personnel and equipment, high-speed air evacuation, and in-flight refueling, its techniques and equipment
have generally been adapted among today's state-of- the art transport aircraft. Because of
the importance of their mission and the manner in which they performed their duties, MAG-25 and
VMJ-253 were two of the reinforcing units of the 1st Marine Division that were included in the
Presidential Unit Citation awarded for the Guadalcanal Campaign. SCAT was subsequently recognized
and honored with the Navy Unit Citation.
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM demonstrated the power of modern air logistics. But that splendid
performance was but an extension of the rapid deployment so well executed 5O years ago. VMH-253,
the progenitor of SCAT, was itself rushed across the oceans. Then, too, its mission was to aid and sustain
assaulting Marines. In doing so, it played its own heroic and vital role in the first United States
counteroffensive of World War II.
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